during his visit. The record, composed of seven documents, was made public after 27 years through a request by the private National Security Archive (NSA). In conversations spanning a total of 13 hours, Zhou and Nixon exchange frank views on a wide range of international issues, including relations with the Soviet Union and India, the Taiwan problem, the security of South Korea and the role of Japan.
Three of the documents were ''sanitized'' by the National Archives, which released the previously classified material, and the excisions touch on the two countries' policies toward other countries, including Japan.
''Numerous excisions in some of the documents show that even today government security reviewers still see some of the information as diplomatically sensitive,'' said the NSA, which is based in George Washington University.
In four-hour talks on Feb. 23, Zhou expressed concern about the possible consequences of Japan's rapid economic development.
''Expanding in such a great way as they are toward foreign lands, the inevitable result will be military expansion,'' Zhou said of Japan.
He also warned Nixon about the possibility of the partnership between the U.S. and Japan changing in the future.
''When they reach a certain point they will cease listening to your words, and this development...will affect the security of the entire Pacific,'' Zhou said, calling the prospect ''worrisome'' because of Japan's ''tradition of militaristic thinking.''
Nixon suggested to Zhou that it was unwise to leave Japan to its own devices.
''Because the Japanese as a people have drive and a history of expansionism, if they are left alone as an economic giant and a military pygmy the inevitable result, I think, will be at this point to make them susceptible to the demands of the militarists,'' he said.
Nixon then pressed his argument for keeping a U.S. military presence in Japan, saying if the U.S. can continue a close relationship with Tokyo, ''we believe this can restrain Japan from following a course'' Zhou described.
In talks the following day, Nixon also addressed Zhou's more specific concerns about Japan, making guarantees that Washington will ''exert influence'' to restrain Japan from entering South Korea in the event of a U.S. troop reduction or withdrawal from South Korea.
After Zhou summed up his understanding that the U.S. troops will not let Japanese forces enter Taiwan while they are still on the island, Nixon said, ''I will go further. We will try to keep Japanese forces from coming into Taiwan after our forces leave.''
This U.S. position was included in modified form as one of the points agreed upon by the two countries in the ''Shanghai Communique'' issued at the end of Nixon's visit.
The U.S., which stationed military forces in Taiwan as part of a 1954 security treaty with Taipei, withdrew its troops after it terminated the treaty and recognized Beijing as China's legitimate government in January 1979.
Zhou also expressed readiness to consider signing a mutual non-aggression pact, including a no-first-use clause, with Japan should Tokyo and Beijing establish diplomatic relations and conclude a peace treaty.
''They are worried about our nuclear armament, but we can guarantee that we will not be the first to use them,'' the Chinese premier said.
Nixon also met with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong during his eight-day visit, but the record of their talks has not been made public.
Sketch of young Zhou Enlai found in artist's storeroom (1999-09-16)China Marks May 4th Anniversary (1999-05-04)Nixon, Zhou Exchanged view on Japan in 1972 summit: declassified document (1999-04-20)Taiwan-born senior China official arrives in Taiwan (1999-01-30)Text of Presidential Speeches at the Summit (2-2: Clinton) (1998-06-28)
